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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
: Case No. 20040108-SC 
PETITIONER-PLAINTIFF, 
v. 
PARLEY PARKER PRATT STUBBS, 
RESPONDENT-DEFENDANT 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the State's petition for a writ of certiorari by virtue 
of Article VIII § 3 of the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(2), (3)(a) and 
(5). 
ISSUES. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
1. Did the Court of Appeals properly distinguish this case from State v. Widdison. 
2001UT60,28P.3dl278? 
On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals for 
correctness, by assessing whether the Court of Appeals applied the correct standard of 
review. See, e ^ , State v. Dean. 2004 UT 63,1f 7, 95 P.3d 276. 
Stubbs preserved the venue and jury issues in the trial court by pretrial motion, 
which was argued and renewed, by asking the court for additional questions regarding the 
prospective jurors' relationships with the alleged victim's family and witnesses, and by 
his challenge for cause to the entire panel of prospective jurors (R. 208-212, T. 46, 50-57, 
60, 100).1 
He also preserved the issues on appeal. See, e.g.. Opening Brief of Appellant at 
27-31. 
2. May this Court affirm the court of appeals on alternative grounds that Widdison 
requires reversal? 
This Court may affirm the Court of Appeals' decision on any basis appearing in 
the record. See, e ^ , American Fork City v. Pena-Flores. 2002 UT 131, f 7; 63 P.3d 675. 
Stubbs preserved the venue and jury issues in the trial court by pretrial motion, 
which was argued and renewed, by asking the court for additional questions regarding the 
prospective jurors' relationships with the alleged victim's family and witnesses, and by 
his challenge for cause to the entire panel of prospective jurors (R. 208-212, T. 46, 50-57, 
60, 100). He argued on appeal that his conviction should be reversed under Widdison. 
E.g., Opening Brief of Appellant at 27 through 32. 
CONTROLLING RULES 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 12, 18 and 29 control, and are copied in the 
addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
]The district court clerk did not number the front cover of the transcripts. The trial 
transcripts are two consecutively paginated documents, which will be cited to as "T." The 
pretrial hearing is paginated independently, and will be cited to as "T. 5/1/2001." 
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NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Stubbs with one count of rape, a first degree felony violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-402, and with one count of forcible sexual abuse, a second degree 
felony violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (R. 6-7). 
Defense counsel repeatedly moved the court for a change of venue, challenged 
individual jurors for cause, asked for more in-depth questioning of jurors, and challenged 
the entire panel for cause on the basis of their implied bias (R. 208-212; T. 45-57, 100). 
The initial motion raised four bases for a change of venue: the apparent 
prominence of the alleged victim's family, the unfounded rumor that Stubbs fled his first 
scheduled trial, the local law enforcement officers' twice approaching Stubbs in the jail to 
discuss his case in the absence of counsel, and the need to protect Stubbs' right to a fair 
trial (R. 211-212). 
The trial court heard the motion for a change of venue the day before trial, but took 
it under advisement after both the State and Stubbs so stipulated (R. 213-214). 
Early in the jury selection process, defense counsel renewed the motion for a 
change of venue, expressing concerns that the prospective jurors from that small 
community were so familiar with the alleged victim, her family, and other members of the 
prosecution team, that they would be deciding credibility issues on the bases of their 
relationships and experiences outside the courtroom, rather than on the evidence (T. 45-
57). Defense counsel cited State v. James. 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989), and argued that 
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under the appropriate objective analysis, a change of venue was required because of the 
small size of the community, the prominence of the alleged victim's family, and the facts 
that Stubbs was a transient construction worker and his counsel was also from outside the 
community (T. 52-53, 56-58). 
In opposing the motion, the prosecutor argued that the motion was not timely or 
adequately supported by evidence in the record (T. 54). 
Defense counsel responded that he did not know until voir dire whether the jurors 
were exposed to any press coverage or whether the law enforcement officers' contacting 
Stubbs in the jail would influence jury selection or whether jurors were aware of any 
earlier continuance of the trial (T. 56). The trial in this case began on September 27, 
2001. The then Beaver County Attorney disclosed to Mr. Stubbs' counsel on the day 
before trial that the alleged victim's mother was the Beaver County Treasurer, a fellow 
elected official. He further disclosed that the alleged victim's grandmother was the 
principal of Beaver High School and that her grandfather was the football coach and a 
teacher for many years at the same school. The alleged victim had a different last name 
than the treasurer. The treasurer had a different last name than the principal and coach (T 
44-46, 52, 56-58). The only disclosure made before September 26 was that the victim's 
family was "prominent." 
The trial court denied the motion, but did not do so on the basis of any perceived 
tardiness or inadequacy in the motion. 
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Rather, he reasoned that prominent people should not have to suffer a change of 
venue any time a defendant came into their community and committed a crime, and that 
the prominence of J.J. 's family was not the proper legal issue, but that actual bias was (T. 
58-59, 98). The court believed the jurors would be fair, based on his experience with 
Beaver County residents as people who often know much about one another and often 
pass judgment on one another more often than people who live in large communities, and 
who do not tend to favor locals over outsiders (T. 58-59, T. 98). 
Defense counsel specifically challenged the entire panel on the basis of their 
implied bias during the discussion of the change of venue motion, and the trial court 
recognized and denied the challenge on the merits (T. 58-59, 98-100). 
Following a trial, the jury convicted Stubbs of rape and acquitted Stubbs of 
forcible sexual abuse (R. 287). 
The trial court sentenced Stubbs to prison for a term of five years to life (R. BOS-
SOS). 
This Court transferred the case to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 317). 
The Court of Appeals reversed Stubbs' conviction. State v. Stubbs, 2004 UT App 
3,84P.3d837. 
The State did not petition for rehearing, but petitioned for a writ of certiorari. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS 
5 
Stubbs was convicted of rape of J. J. At trial, Stubbs contended that the sexual 
intercourse was consensual, while JJ. maintained that it was not. See, Stubbs, 2004 UT 
App3,1f2. 
Beaver County and Beaver City where the trial occurred are very small, with 
respective populations of 5,400 and 2,900 (R. 208-212, T. 50-57). 
JJ. came from a prominent and well-regarded family in Beaver County - her 
mother was the Beaver County Treasurer who ran unopposed in the election before the 
trial; her grandfather had been the town football coach and school teacher; and she and 
various members of her family attended the LDS church in that small community (R. 208-
212, T. 50-57).2 
The prosecutor and primary government witnesses were well-known locals, 
whereas Stubbs was a construction worker from out of town, and his defense attorney was 
also from out of town (R. 208-212, T. 50-57). 
While Stubbs was in jail, the police twice approached him illegally without 
counsel present in efforts to persuade him to plead guilty, arguably reflecting an unfair 
attitude toward Stubbs in Beaver County (R. 208-212, T. 50-57). 
Eleven of the twenty-seven jurors were excused because their relationships with 
2Religion was at issue in the case, given J.J.'s testimony that she trusted Stubbs 
because he was wearing a CTR ring and said he was a member of the LDS church, and 
given the prosecutor's questions of Stubbs regarding whether he was a member in good 
standing, and regarding his failure to comply with behavioral standards governing the 
religion (T .300-01, 324-35). 
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J.J.'s family or the Beaver County prosecutor, their knowledge of the case, or their 
relationships with government witnesses would influence their deliberations (T. 15, 18, 
19,24-25, 76, 61-62, 69, 84; R. 253). Eight of the final sixteen who were not excused for 
cause had relationships with key government witnesses or the prosecutor.3 
Of the twenty-seven jurors who participated in voir dire, no one recognized or had 
any relationship with Stubbs or defense counsel (T. 27). 
The alleged victim 
"was a defenseless juvenile, a virgin who was allegedly raped by a near-
stranger eight years older than she was. Rape is a first-degree felony, 
punishable to the same extent as murder. Considering that Beaver County 
3Of the eight jurors who sat, Juror McMullin was a "good friend" of Officer 
Chambers, who took and conveyed Stubbs' and J.J.'s statements regarding the charged 
offense (T. 210-251), had J.J.'s grandfather as his son's coach, and worked with J.J.'s 
grandfather (T. 24, 73). Juror Dalton was the nurse of Dr. Melling, who examined J.J. 
and testified that her injuries were consistent with her account of events but not 
inconsistent with consensual intercourse (T. 183, 184-86), and worked with him at the 
hospital (T. 22). Juror Sherwood had done business with J.J.'s mother and also knew her 
grandfather (T. 89-90). Juror Burnette was close friends with officer Chambers, who 
took and conveyed the statements of J.J. and Stubbs, and was once hired by the 
prosecutor, but ended up not taking the job (T. 79). 
Stubbs used peremptory challenges to strike prospective juror Hansen (R. 253), 
whose wife worked with Dr. Melling, who had Dr. Melling in his bishopric, who knew 
J.J.'s grandfather and talked to him regularly, and who knew J.J.'s mother but did not 
know her as well (T. 63-64, 66-67); to strike prospective juror Cress Sero Lorenzo, who 
used to work with the Beaver County Sheriffs Department eight years before the trial, 
and who knew Deputy Chambers (T. 87-88); and to strike prospective juror Jodi Lynn 
Kesler, who knew J.J.'s grandparents from church and from J.J's grandfather's being a 
teacher in her high school (T. 74). 
The prosecutor's first peremptory challenge struck prospective juror Brandon Lynn 
Davis, who used to be neighbors with J.J. twelve years before, who knew her mother, and 
who had J.J.'s grandfather for his fifth grade teacher (T. 70, 72). 
7 
has averaged only 1.09 rapes per year from 1990- 2000, a single instance of 
rape is certainly a notable, memorable, and heinous crime. See Utah 
Commission on Criminal & Juvenile Justice, Local Crime Information, 
at http://www.justice.utah.gov. 
... The voir dire demonstrates that a number of potential jurors had been 
given the details of the case from a source outside the courtroom. As for the 
nature of the publicity, the details of the case had been transmitted directly 
to the jurors via interested parties rather than from a more removed source 
like the media." 
Stubbs. 2004 UT App 3, fflj 18 and 19, 84 P.3d 837. 
Defense counsel repeatedly moved the trial court to change venue, challenged 
individual jurors for cause, asked for more in-depth questioning of jurors, and challenged 
the entire panel for cause on the basis of their implied bias (R. 208-212; T. 45-57, 100). 
Defense counsel argued that given that the crux of the case was comparative credibility of 
the prosecution's case and Stubbs', the jurors would be basing their credibility 
assessments on the basis of their experiences with government witnesses and team 
members outside the courtroom (R. 208-212, T. 50-57). 
The final jurors were Thompson, McMullin, Burnette, Barton, Campbell, Dalton, 
Anderson and Sherwood (T. 94; R. 253). 
Four of these jurors were biased in favor of the State. Juror McMullin was a 
"good friend" of Officer Chambers, had J.J.'s grandfather as his son's coach, and worked 
with J.J.'s grandfather (T. 24, 73). Juror Dalton was the nurse of Dr. Melling, and worked 
with him at the hospital (T. 22). Juror Sherwood had done business with J.J.'s mother 
and also knew her grandfather (T. 89-90).- Juror Burnette was close friends with officer 
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Chambers, and was once hired by the prosecutor, but ended up not taking the job (T. 79). 
Stubbs could not have cured the problem with his four peremptory challenges, 
because he had to use three of his peremptory challenges to remove other jurors with 
similar biases caused by having the trial in Beaver County. Stubbs used peremptory 
challenges to strike prospective juror Hansen (R. 253), whose wife worked with Dr. 
Melling, who had Dr. Melling in his bishopric, who knew J.J.'s grandfather and talked to 
him regularly, and who knew J.J.'s mother but did not know her as well (T. 63-64, 66-
67); to strike prospective juror Cress Sero Lorenzo, who used to work with the Beaver 
County Sheriffs Department eight years before the trial, and who knew Deputy 
Chambers (T. 87-88); and to strike prospective juror Jodi Lynn Kesler, who knew J.J.'s 
grandparents from church and from JJ's grandfather's being a teacher in her high school 
(T. 74). 
The prosecutor's first peremptory challenge struck prospective juror Brandon Lynn 
Davis, who used to be neighbors with J.J. twelve years before, who knew her mother, and 
who had J.J.'s grandfather for his fifth grade teacher (T. 70, 72). 
While Stubbs' counsel's argument specifically referred to State v. James. 767 P.2d 
549 (Utah 1989), and addressed the James factors for change of venue (T. 51-53, 56-60), 
the trial court did not correctly or fully apply the James analysis in reaching his ruling, but 
rather, took issue with the reasoning behind James, and insisted on focusing on his 
personal assessment of the impartial nature of Beaver County jurors. He stated, 
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"Well, the difficulty with that argument is that that means that 
anybody who holds any position of prominence in the community would 
face that same challenge if something happened to a member of their 
family. And I don't think that's what the law is. I don't think that the 
defendant who happens to wander into a community and commit a crime, 
assuming that a crime was committed here, can have the case moved out of 
the county because the victim that was chosen turns out to be somebody of 
prominence. I don't think that's what we are talking about in the law. 
The questions that I asked the jury were designed to determine 
whether in fact there was an actual bias, whether they would favor Mrs. 
Joseph just because of her position she holds in the community, or favor her 
daughter because of her position in the community. And all the jurors gave 
me forthright answers indicating they would not. Having been the judge in 
this community for 15 years or so, I believe them. I think that they will 
independently assess the evidence. And if they think that this was a 
consensual act, I don't think any of them will have any difficulty finding in 
favor of Mr. Stubbs. And even though they go to church with Mrs. Joseph 
the next Sunday, folks who live in small communities, it's been my 
experience, make judgments about one another on a daily basis and may 
know a lot more about one another than people who live in a large 
community. That's just the way they get along. They have to make those 
judgments and then still be able to look the people in the eye the next day. 
It's been my experience that Beaver County juries are extremely 
independent and don't tend to favor the local individual against the 
individual from outside. 
Like Mr. Kanell has said, I have seen several cases where in spite of 
testimony from Beaver County residents, the juries have found in favor of 
the person from outside the community. So I have found that they are very 
independent. It is true that it's problematic. And that's one of the James 
factors, that [J.J.] may enjoy some higher standing in the community than 
Mr. Stubbs. But that's only one of the factors that the court has to consider. 
That's not determinative of the issue. 
Overall looking at the entire picture, looking at the answers that I 
have received and with what I know about Beaver juries, I am satisfied that 
this jury is prepared to try this case on the evidence presented during the 
trial and the law as I give it without reference to personalities. I think that's 
how they live their lives. And I think we can count on them to do the same 
in this case. So I'm going to deny the motion to change the venue just 
because of [J.J.'s mother's] position and the influence it might have on the 
jurors. I haven't found any evidence that it would influence them." 
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(T. 58-60). 
When defense counsel noted that the proper analysis should be an objective one, 
the trial court interjected, "Well, I was trying to be a reasonable person." (T. 60). 
PROCEEDINGS ON APPEAL 
On appeal, Stubbs argued that under State v. Widdison. 2001 UT 60, 28 P.3d 1278, 
the trial court's denial of a change of venue entitled him to a new trial because his jurors 
were biased, under Utah R.Crim. P. 18(e)(4), which provides that a juror is subject to 
removal for cause on the basis of 
"the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to 
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when 
viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective 
juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism. ..." 
See Opening Brief of Appellant at 31-32. 
Stubbs argued that his jury was not fair and impartial because four of the final 
jurors who deliberated and convicted him were biased under the objective standard of 
Rule 18, supra, because of their relationship with the State's witnesses. See Opening 
Brief of Appellant at 27-32. 
In addition to seeking reversal under Widdison, Stubbs argued that the change of 
venue decision was fundamentally undermined by the trial court's disagreement with and 
refusal to follow James. Stubbs asked the Court of Appeals to correct the trial court's 
11 
failure to comply with James. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 32-37.4 
The State mistakenly argued that counsel for Stubbs waived the venue issue by 
failing to challenge for cause the specific jurors, and by passing the entire panel for cause, 
State's Brief at 15-20, 22-23. In so arguing, the State apparently failed to recognize that 
counsel for Stubbs did challenge the entire panel for cause, as the trial court recognized 
(T. 51, 100). 
The State also argued that the trial court's James analysis was irrelevant on appeal 
from a jury verdict, and that the jurors who actually served were not biased. State's brief 
at 21, 24-28. 
In deciding the appeal, the court of appeals began with a background statement 
carefully detailing the procedural and factual history of the jury selection, and included in 
its history the facts suggesting that several of the jurors, including four of the jurors who 
served (McMullin, Sherwood, Dalton and Burnett), were biased. Stubbs, 2004 Ut App 3, 
at §§ 3-10. See also State's petition at 10 (recognizing that "the court of appeals 
4The State currently argues that on appeal, Stubbs argued that "the trial court 
improperly determined his motion based on whether the jury panel exhibited actual bias, 
rather than concluding that the prominence of the victim's family in the small town of 
Beaver precluded a fair trial. Aplt. Br. at 33-37." State's brief at 8. 
Actually, Stubbs never argued that the trial court improperly found that the jurors 
were not actually biased. Rather, he argued that the trial court erred in denying a change 
of venue on the basis of the trial court's beliefs that Beaver County jurors are judgmental 
of locals by nature and would be fair to Stubbs, and that prominent local people should 
not have to face a change of venue when people from out of town are charged with crimes 
against them. See Opening Brief of Appellant at 33-37. 
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identifies twenty prospective jurors who purportedly gave statements suggestive of 
bias."). 
The Court of Appeals stated the correct standard of review, and carefully applied 
the James factors to the record of Stubbs' case, demonstrating why the trial court should 
have changed the venue of Stubbs' trial. See Stubbs. 2004 UT App 3, tlf 12-19. 
Based on the unique procedural history of Stubbs' case, the court analyzed and 
rejected the State's argument that the court was forbidden by Widdison to apply the James 
factors because Stubbs' appeal was direct, rather than interlocutory. The court explained, 
In State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 28 P.3d 1278, the supreme court 
explained that "[o]n appeal from a jury verdict, we do not look to the James 
factors to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
a change of venue. Instead, we examine whether defendant was ultimately 
tried by a fair and impartial jury." Id. at ^ 38. However, this case is different 
from Widdison. Even though Stubbs takes his appeal from a jury verdict, we 
apply the James factors because they were never appropriately considered 
by the trial court. Further, the court began jury voir dire before even ruling 
on Stubbs's motion for a change of venue. This is important because, in 
Widdison, the supreme court recognized that "the unique circumstance of 
the interlocutory appeal [in James ] 'afforded us the opportunity to review 
the denial [of the change of venue motion] before any error committed 
would be prejudicial to the defendant.' We reversed the order denying the 
motion to change venue in order to serve judicial economy." IdM ^ 
38(citation omitted). 
In Widdison, the defendant filed a motion to change venue in 
November 1996. See id. at <[[17. The trial court denied the motion, but 
allowed Widdison to raise the issue again at trial. See id. Widdison's trial 
did not begin until April 30, 1998. See id. at ^18. During the nearly eighteen 
months that elapsed between the time the court denied Widdison's motion 
for a change of venue and trial, no interlocutory appeal was taken. By 
contrast, in this instance, because the trial court did not rule on Stubbs's 
motion for a change of venue before trial, Stubbs did not have any 
opportunity to take an interlocutory appeal and thereby "serve judicial 
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economy." Id.ai f 38. 
Stubbs at HI 21-22. 
The court concluded that in light of the totality of the circumstances, the trial 
court's failure to rule on the change of venue motion before trial and to apply the 
James factors constituted an abuse of discretion. Id. at f^ 22. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The court of appeals correctly distinguished State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, 28 
P.3d 1278, because the trial court in the instant matter did not apply, but instead took 
issue with, State v. James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989). 
The court of appeals did not reject the holding of Widdison, or set a precedent 
which will encourage delay in the filing of change of venue motions. This Court's 
longstanding precedent, State v. Pieren, 583 P.2d 69 (1978), holds that trial courts may 
deny change of venue motions for delay alone, thus encouraging defendants with 
meritorious change of venue claims to file them promptly upon becoming aware of the 
bases for such motion. 
This Court should thus affirm the Stubbs decision. 
2. Alternatively, this Court can and should affirm the court of appeals on the basis 
that reversal is required by Widdison. Stubbs' counsel challenged all the jurors for cause 
on the basis of their implied bias in the midst of jury selection, with the expressed 
intention of making Stubbs' position clear once and for all so there would be no need to 
14 
repeat it (T. 51-60). The trial court permitted this motion to be made in the midst of voir 
dire, and also recognized and denied the same motion at the close of voir dire (T. 51, 
100). Two of the jurors who convicted Stubbs revealed their biases prior to this for-cause 
challenge (T. 21, 24), and all of the jurors were subjected to this challenge to the panel (T. 
51, 100). The jurors were legally biased by virtue of their relationship with the State's 
witnesses. See, e ^ , State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah 1977). 
Because biased jurors participated in convicting Stubbs, his conviction should be 
reversed under Widdison. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY DISTINGUISHED 
WIDDISON. 
The State claims that in Stubbs, the Court of Appeals made an unauthorized and 
eviscerating exception to Widdison, which portends to encourage defendants to move for 
a change of venue too late to seek an interlocutory appeal, and then seek direct appellate 
relief under the James factors, despite the fact that their juries were actually fair and 
impartial. See, e.g.. State's brief at 14.5 The State complains further that the Court of 
Appeals has shifted the focus from the relevant inquiry established in Widdison as to 
whether the jury was fair and impartial, to the irrelevant inquiry of whether the defendant 
5The State contends that Stubbs5 motion for a change of venue was "belated" and 
tardily filed. R&. State's brief at 10 and 13 n.12. Actually, neither Utah Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12 nor rule 29 sets a deadline for filing such a motion. 
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had an opportunity to seek interlocutory appeal. See, e.g., id. 
The State's contention about Stubbs' encouraging defendants to delay bringing 
motions for a change of venue is readily countered by the law from this Court recognizing 
that trial courts have full authority to deny motions for a change of venue solely on the 
basis of delay, despite the fact that neither rule 12 nor rule 29 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure contain any deadline for filing such motions. See, State v. Pieren, 
583P.2d69(1978). 
In Pieren, the defendant complained on appeal that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion for a change of venue for lack of timeliness, and argued that the statute 
governing the motion for a change of venue set no time limit for such motions, and 
permitted them to be filed anytime before trial. Id. at 72. 
This Court promptly rejected the contention, recognizing the trial court's discretion 
to deny such motions when their apparent basis is delay, and the trial court's authority to 
insure efficient litigation with such rulings if its seems likely that a fair jury can be 
impaneled. Id. The Court noted that the bases for the motion were known well in 
advance of trial, and concluded that the trial court was well within its discretion in 
rejecting the motion in these circumstances. Id. at 72. 
A criminal defendant with a valid basis for a change of venue under James has no 
incentive to delay bringing the motion, because this would risk denial of the motion solely 
on the basis of delay, and thus risk an unfair trial. Further, the State's argument fails to 
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consider the belated disclosure of the true prominence of the victim's family in the 
community. 
The State claims inaccurately that the court of appeals applied the James factors 
"mainly because it considered that the trial court had deprived defendant of the 
opportunity to take an interlocutory appeal.5' State's brief page 13 n.12. The court of 
appeals applied the James factors on appeal "because they were never appropriately 
considered by the trial court." Stubbs, 2004 UT App 3, at ^  20. 
While the Court of Appeals did distinguish Widdison from Stubbs' case because 
the trial court did not rule on the motion for a change of venue until the trial had begun, 
thus rendering resort to interlocutory appeal impractical, Stubbs, ffl| 21-22, the court also 
discussed the biases of the jurors, id. at fflf 5-9,6 and certainly never rejected the holding 
of Widdison, as the State claims on page 12 of its brief. 
The points the Stubbs court made were valid and important points required by the 
unique procedural posture of this case: that trial courts faced with motions to change 
venue should properly apply the factors set forth by James, and should rule on the 
motions promptly if they are to afford the appellate courts an opportunity to serve judicial 
economy through interlocutory appeals. See Stubbs at ffl[ 13-22. 
6The State claims that the court of appeals properly declined to address Stubbs' 
arguments regarding the biases of the jurors who sat because Stubbs waived the issue. 
State's brief at 17 n.13. The court of appeals did not indicate any such waiver, but instead 
actually recognized the biases that Stubbs argued in his appellate brief. See Stubbs at fflf 
5-9. 
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The State's claims about the adverse impact of Stubbs are further undermined by 
three erroneous premises. 
First, the Stubbs court did not create a general exception to Widdison, that 
threatens to eviscerate it. Instead, Stubbs first acknowledged and quoted the rule of 
Widdison, and then found the rule inapplicable for two reasons which were unique to, and 
indisputably established in the record of this case: 1) the trial court did not properly 
consider the James factors, and 2) the trial court did not rule on the motion for a change 
of venue until the midst of jury selection. See Stubbs, supra, at fflf 20-21. 
Trial courts in this State do not routinely take issue with or fail to consider the 
James factors, or delay resolution of motions for changes of venue until the midst of jury 
selections. Thus, the unique procedural facts upon which the court of appeals' decision 
turns are unlikely to reoccur, or to eviscerate the Widdison decision. 
Second, the State is mistaken in its theme that the court of appeals granted the new 
trial despite the fact that Stubbs conceded that his jury was fair and impartial, and did not 
challenge, but passed, the jurors for cause. See, e.g.. State's brief at 13-14. 
The relevant pages of the transcript, which are in the addendum to this brief, 
demonstrate that after Stubbs' counsel objected to three specific jurors because their 
relationships with the prosecution and its witnesses might cause them to assess credibility 
on the basis of experiences outside the courtroom (T. 45-51), Stubbs' counsel asked the 
court if he would like to hear his objection to the general panel (T. 51). Counsel asked 
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the court if the court wanted to hear the objection at that juncture "to save time" so they 
would not have to "come back" and repeat the argument with regard to subsequent jurors 
(T. 51). The trial court said he did want to hear the challenge (T. 51). Counsel explained 
that the objection was related to the motion for a change of venue which the court had 
under advisement, and explained that a challenge for cause would lie under Utah R. Crim 
P. 18(e)(14), for 
"the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to 
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when 
viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective 
juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism. ..." 
(T.51). 
He noted that nine of the jurors on the panel had a relationship with J.J.'s mother, 
the county treasurer, and then argued why a change of venue was required under the 
appropriate analysis under James (T. 52-53, 56-58). 
The trial court denied the motion to change venue (T. 59). 
At the close of voir dire and after Stubbs' counsel passed the jury for cause (T. 92), 
he made a record of the fact that he had challenged the entire panel for cause on the basis 
of their implied bias, in discussing the motion for a change of venue (T. 100). The trial 
court recognized that Stubbs' counsel had made such a motion, and that the court denied 
it (T. 100). 
The State suggests that the challenge to the panel was inadequate, because it did 
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not address jurors summoned after the challenge, State's brief at 15-16. However, two of 
the jurors who actually served on Stubbs' jury had already revealed their biases at the 
time counsel made the challenge to the panel.7 
The State notes that under Utah R. Crim. P. 18, a challenge to the panel is 
appropriate only on the basis of '"a material departure from the procedure prescribed with 
respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the panel.'" State's brief at 16, 
quoting Rule 18(c)(l)(i). 
When a jury is selected in a small town in a case wherein a community outsider is 
charged with a dreadful crime against a vulnerable and respected member of the 
community, despite the fact that many of the jurors have biases in favor of the alleged 
victim and the prosecution, because the trial court disregards controlling precedent from 
the Utah Supreme Court because he believes that the jurors in that community are by 
nature fair and judgmental of their fellow townspeople, this constitutes a material 
departure from the proper procedure prescribed for jury selection. See, e.g.. State v. 
James, 767 P.2d 549 (Utah 1989). 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
REVERSAL UNDER WIDDISON. 
The State contends that there was no basis for reversal under Widdison, because 
7Juror Mcmullin testified that she was good friend of Officer Chambers, and had 
socialized with him (T. 24). Juror Dalton testified that she was Dr. Melling's nurse and 
worked with him at the hospital (T. 21). 
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there is no indication that Stubbs' jury was partial, as is demonstrated by Stubbs5 lawyer's 
supposedly passing the jurors for cause. State's brief at 15. As discussed above, counsel 
challenged, and did not pass, the jurors for cause (T. 100). 
This Court may affirm the court of appeals' decision on any basis appearing in the 
record, and should do so in this case because Widdison requires the reversal of Stubbs5 
conviction. See, e.g., American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, f 7; 63 P.3d 675. 
Utah Code Ann. section 77-1-6, Article I sections 7 and 12 of the Utah 
Constitution, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution 
guarantee Mr. Stubbs' right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. A change of venue is 
sometimes the only way to insure a fair trial. E.g. State v. Caver, 814 P.2d 604, 608-610 
(UtahApp. 1991). 
Under Widdison, reversal is appropriate if an appellant can identify biased jurors 
who reached a final verdict. See, e ^ , State v. Widdison, 2001 UT 60, fflf 2, 3; 28 P.3d 
1278, 1286. 
A juror is biased or subject to removal for cause for 
the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to 
have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when 
viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective 
juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified solely because 
the juror is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision thereof[.] 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18(e)(4) (emphasis added). 
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Mr. Stubbs' jury was not fair and impartial. As noted above, four of the final 
jurors who deliberated and convicted Stubbs were biased under the objective standard of 
Rule 18, supra, because of their relationship with the State's witnesses.8 Stubbs could not 
have cured the problem with his four peremptory challenges, because he had to use three 
of his peremptory challenges to remove other jurors with similar biases caused by having 
the trial in Beaver County.9 
The foregoing facts establish bias in this legal context, and independently support 
reversing Stubbs' conviction. See, e.g., State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 802 (Utah 1977). 
In Brooks, this Court found an abuse of discretion when the trial court denied two 
8The final jurors were Thompson, McMullin, Burnette, Barton, Campbell, Dalton, 
Anderson and Sherwood (T. 94; R. 253) 
Juror McMullin was a "good friend" of Officer Chambers, had J.J.'s grandfather 
as his son's coach, and worked with J.J.'s grandfather (T. 24, 73). Juror Dalton was the 
nurse of Dr. Melling, and worked with him at the hospital (T. 22). Juror Sherwood had 
done business with J.J.'s mother and also knew her grandfather (T. 89-90). Juror 
Burnette was close friends with officer Chambers, and was once hired by the prosecutor, 
but ended up not taking the job (T. 79). 
9Stubbs used peremptory challenges to strike prospective juror Hansen (R. 253), 
whose wife worked with Dr. Melling, who had Dr. Melling in his bishopric, who knew 
J.J.'s grandfather and talked to him regularly, and who knew J.J.'s mother but did not 
know her as well (T. 63-64, 66-67); to strike prospective juror Cress Sero Lorenzo, who 
used to work with the Beaver County Sheriffs Department eight years before the trial, 
and who knew Deputy Chambers (T. 87-88); and to strike prospective juror Jodi Lynn 
Kesler, who knew J.J.'s grandparents from church and from JJ's grandfather's being a 
teacher in her high school (T. 74). Counsel asked the judge to assess the issue with an 
objective standard (T. 60, 100). 
The prosecutor's first peremptory challenge struck prospective juror Brandon Lynn 
Davis, who used to be neighbors with J.J. twelve years before, who knew her mother, and 
who had J.J.'s grandfather for his fifth grade teacher (T. 70, 72). 
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challenges for cause for jurors who were close friends with two important government 
witnesses, finding that such jurors could not reasonably be expected to do their job of 
standing as a neutral arbiter between the defendant and the State. Id. at 802. The Court 
of Appeals explained that even if the juror sincerely believed that the friendship with one 
of the witnesses would not impact on the juror's credibility assessment, this was too much 
to expect. The Court explained further, "A juror is not in any position to weigh the 
evidence of his friend against the evidence of strangers and ... [thereby to] stand 
indifferent between the state and the accused. Where there have been personal 
associations, such as the ones here; to remain uninfluenced, unbiased, and unprejudiced; 
runs counter to human nature." Id. 
Similarly here, four of the jurors on Stubbs' jury had close personal relationships 
with the victim's family and other key prosecution witnesses, and regardless of any 
claims of impartiality they may have voiced or even believed, the trial court abused his 
discretion in permitting the jury to proceed, given the partial makeup of the jury. Cf. id. 
See also State v. Calliham. 2002 UT 86 ffi[ 47-59, 55 P.3d 573 (trial court did not abuse 
discretion in excusing potential jurors with ties to the defendant's grandparents and others 
involved in the case, and with recognized biases). 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the court of appeals' reversal of Mr. Stubbs' conviction, 
and remand this matter to the trial court for a new, fair trial. 
Respectfully submitted this P" day of September, 2004. 
Edward K. Brass 
Attorney for Mr. Stubbs 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY 
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Attorney General Ken Bronston, 160 East 300 South, PO Box 140833, Salt Lake City, 
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ADDENDUM 
RELEVANT TRANSCRIPT PAGES 
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MR. BRASS: Could I ask one question as a follow-up to 
that? Do you even know who the defendant was in that other 
case? 
MS. THOMPSON: No. 
MR. BRASS: I didn't think so. Thanks. 
THE COURT: Okay. Anybody else? Okay. Miss 
Thompson, we111 ask you not to discuss this issue with any of 
the other jurors. And if they ask you what we talked about, 
don't tell them. 
MS. THOMPSON: 1 won't. 
THE COURT: You can tell them after the trial. Now, 
are there any others you would like to talk to in chambers? 
MR. BRASS: Individually, no. 
THE COURT: Okay. Do either of you have any further 
voir dire questions you would like me to pose? 
MR. BRASS: I would like you to go back to the one 
about how they know the older Marshalls. I think you asked 
nat question, got one response, rephrased it, and moved to a 
a ferent question. So I think there was only one person that 
| f 4 i ^ 0 n d e d ^ust what the nature of their relationship was. 
^§l!>\ T H E COURT: Okay. You would like to dig further into 
^ ure
 o f t h e i r relationships with the Marshalls? 
Ikj ' BRASS: I mean, I have a general objection later 
L re a r e three people who give me concern right now. 
I t e l 1 You who they are. 
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found any evidence that it would influence them. 
MR. BRASS: And I don't disagree with what you just 
said. Just to be clear for the record, I was just making a 
record. And my argument deals with the objective standard that 
seems to be in the rule itself to look at it, the reasonable 
person as opposed to --
THE COURT: Well, I was trying to be a reasonable 
person. 
MR. BRASS: I thought you did a pretty reasonable job. 
THE COURT: Okay. Let's go out and take care of those 
three that -- and the questions about Al and Ann Marshall. 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings 
were held in open court.) 
THE COURT: We appreciate your patience. The jury 
is — the jury panel is back in their places as are all the 
potential jurors and defendant and his counsel and counsel for 
the state. 
During the recess we were able to take care of quite a 
bit of business and discuss some legal issues in the matter. 
I asked a question earlier about your relationship 
with Al and Ann Marshall. And several of you indicated that 
You knew them, had some kind of relationship. I would like to 
return to that question and have each of you who raised your 
hand to indicate a relationship, tell us the nature of your 
relationship with Al and/or Ann Marshall, if you have not 
those. During this recess would be a good time. Then, when we 
take the bench, we'll do it without the jury present. Then 
I111 hear any exceptions you have with regard to those 
preliminary instructions. Wefll be in recess. 
(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.) 
THE COURT: Back in session. It's 16 minutes to noon. 
The jury is not present. Defendant and his counsel and counsel 
for the state are present. As a first order of business, I'm 
going to deny the motion for change of venue for the reasons 
stated in chambers. And I won't say anything further about 
that at this point. 
Second order of business is, I would like to know if 
there are any exceptions to the first six jury instructions 
that I gave you this morning. Any from the state? 
MR. KANELL: No exceptions from the state. 
THE COURT: Either for the defense? 
MR. BRASS: No. None. 
THE COURT: Okay. What I propose to do is invite the 
jury in and read these preliminary instructions. And by then I 
think we'll probably be ready to break for lunch. Is that 
okay? Anci we'll start with opening statements upon our return. 
MR. BRASS: What time will that be? 
THE COURT: Oh, I usually break for an hour and 15 
Minutes. 
MR. BRASS: Okay. 
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who is involved in the case, you donft have to run out 
screaming. You just have to not talk to them. Okay? See you 
at 1:10. 
(Whereupon, the following proceedings were held in 
open court outside the presence of the jury.) 
THE COURT: The jurors have now left the room and the 
door is closed. 
MR. BRASS: I don!t know how well I articulated this 
when we were in chambers, because it was in the context of the 
discussion about motion for change of venue, now denied. But 
it was my intention, I hope I made it clear, that I was also 
stating an objection to the panel as a whole on the basis of 
implied bias, which my recollection is you also denied. 
THE COURT: That is true. I appreciate clarifying 
that. 
MR. BRASS: That's all. 
THE COURT: That was, at least, my intention. 
MR. BRASS: That's what I heard. 
THE COURT: Regardless how well I articulated it. 
MR. BRASS: I thought it was pretty clear. 
THE COURT: Anything else? 
MR. KANELL: Your Honor, my witness, Dr. Doty, is 
her 
And the victim will be here. I just wanted to let you 
kttow that's who I have now sitting here. 
THE COURT: You mean you want them to be inside the 
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RELEVANT COURT RULES 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 12 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, which, unless 
made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in accordance with this rule. A 
motion shall state succinctly and with particularity the grounds upon which it is made and 
the relief sought. A motion need not be accompanied by a memorandum unless required 
by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a motion and 
the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the motion for decision. The 
request shall be a separate pleading captioned "Request to Submit for Decision." The 
Request to Submit for Decision shall state the date on which the motion was served, the 
date the opposing memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if 
any, was served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall contain 
a certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, the motion will not be 
submitted for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, including request 
for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of determination without the 
trial of the general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. 
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or information other 
than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to charge an offense, which objection 
shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the date of 
sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten days of the entry of conviction. 
(d) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the court for good 
cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. Where factual issues are 
involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record. 
(e) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests 
which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver 
thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
(f) Except injustices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all proceedings at the 
hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(g) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the prosecution or in 
the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be continued for a reasonable 
and specified time pending the filing of a new indictment or information. Nothing in this 
rule shall be deemed to affect provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18 
(a) The judge shall determine the method of selecting the jury and notify the parties at a 
pretrial conference or otherwise prior to trial. The following procedures for selection are 
not exclusive. 
(a)(1) Strike and replace method. The court shall summon the number of the jurors that 
are to try the cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all 
peremptory challenges permitted, and for all challenges for cause granted. At the 
direction of the judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and 
determine challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The 
judge may and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause 
outside the hearing of the jurors. After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror 
shall be called to fill the vacancy, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause. 
When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall provide a list of the jurors 
remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon its 
peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn, as the court may direct, until 
all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the 
remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
including any alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute 
the jury. If alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, 
unless otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(2) Struck method. The court shall summon the number of jurors that are to try the 
cause plus such an additional number as will allow for any alternates, for all peremptory 
challenges permitted and for all challenges for cause granted. At the direction of the 
judge, the clerk shall call jurors in random order. The judge may hear and determine 
challenges for cause during the course of questioning or at the end thereof. The judge may 
and, at the request of any party, shall hear and determine challenges for cause outside the 
hearing of the jurors. When the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall 
provide a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, beginning with the prosecution, shall 
indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in regular turn until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The clerk shall then call the remaining 
jurors, or so many of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, including any 
alternate jurors, and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury. If 
alternate jurors have been selected, the last jurors called shall be the alternates, unless 
otherwise ordered by the court prior to voir dire. 
(a)(3) In courts using lists of prospective jurors generated in random order by computer, 
the clerk may call the jurors in that random order. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to conduct the examination of the 
prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court may 
permit counsel or the defendant to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as 
it deems proper, or may itself submit to the prospective jurors additional questions 
requested by counsel or the defendant. Prior to examining the jurors, the court may make 
a preliminary statement of the case. The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to 
make a preliminary statement of the case, and notify the parties in advance of trial. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an individual juror. 
(c)(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to serve at a particular court or for the trial of a 
particular action. A challenge to the panel is an objection made to all jurors summoned 
and may be taken by either party. 
(c)(l)(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the 
procedure prescribed with respect to the selection, drawing, summoning and return of the panel. 
(c)(1)(h) The challenge to the panel shall be taken before the jury is sworn and shall be in 
writing or made upon the record. It shall specifically set forth the facts constituting the 
grounds of the challenge. 
(c)(l)(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed by the adverse party, a hearing may be 
had to try any question of fact upon which the challenge is based. The jurors challenged, 
and any other persons, may be called as witnesses at the hearing thereon. 
(c)(l)(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If the challenge to the panel is allowed, the 
court shall discharge the jury so far as the trial in question is concerned. If a challenge is 
denied, the court shall direct the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(c)(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be either peremptory or for cause. A 
challenge to an individual juror may be made only before the jury is sworn to try the 
action, except the court may, for good cause, permit it to be made after the juror is sworn 
but before any of the evidence is presented. In challenges for cause the rules relating to 
challenges to a panel and hearings thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause shall be 
taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror for which no reason need be given. 
In capital cases, each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In other felony cases 
each side is entitled to four peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side is 
entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is more than one defendant the court may 
allow the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised 
separately or jointly. 
(e) A challenge for cause is an objection to a particular juror and shall be heard and 
determined by the court. The juror challenged and any other person may be examined as a 
witness on the hearing of such challenge. A challenge for cause may be taken on one or 
more of the following grounds. On its own motion the court may remove a juror upon the 
same grounds. 
(e)(1) want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law; 
(e)(2) any mental or physical infirmity which renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of a juror; 
(e)(3) consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured by the offense charged, or on whose complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(e)(4) the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between 
the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or 
injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to 
reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a 
verdict which would be free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall not be disqualified 
solely because the juror is indebted to or employed by the state or a political subdivision 
thereof; 
(e)(5) having been or being the party adverse to the defendant in a civil action, or having 
complained against or having been accused by the defendant in a criminal prosecution; 
(e)(6) having served on the grand jury which found the indictment; 
(e)(7) having served on a trial jury which has tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(e)(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn to try the same charge, and whose verdict 
was set aside, or which was discharged without a verdict after the case was submitted to it; 
(e)(9) having served as a juror in a civil action brought against the defendant for the act 
charged as an offense; 
(e)(10) if the offense charged is punishable with death, the entertaining of opinions about 
the death penalty as would preclude the juror from voting to impose the death penalty 
following conviction or would require the juror to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(e)(l 1) because the juror is or, within one year preceding, has been engaged or interested 
in carrying on any business, calling or employment, the carrying on of which is a 
violation of law, where defendant is charged with a like offense; 
(e)(12) because the juror has been a witness, either for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand jury; 
(e)(13) having formed or expressed an unqualified opinion or belief as to whether the 
defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged; or 
(e)(14) conduct, responses, state of mind or other circumstances that reasonably lead the 
court to conclude the juror is not likely to act impartially. No person may serve as a juror, 
if challenged, unless the judge is convinced the juror can and will act impartially and fairly. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the prosecution and then by the defense 
alternately. Challenges for cause shall be completed before peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be impaneled. Alternate jurors, in the order 
in which they are called, shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury retires to 
consider its verdict, become unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The 
prosecution and defense shall each have one additional peremptory challenge for each 
alternate juror to be chosen. Alternate jurors shall be selected at the same time and in the 
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same examination 
and challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, powers, and 
privileges as principal jurors. Except in bifurcated proceedings, an alternate juror who 
does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged when the jury retires to consider its 
verdict. The identity of the alternate jurors may be withheld until the jurors begin 
deliberations. 
(h) When the jury is selected an oath shall be administered to the jurors, in substance, that 
they and each of them will well and truly try the matter in issue between the parties, and 
render a true verdict according to the evidence and the instructions of the court. 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 
(a) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a trial has 
begun is unable to continue with the trial, any other judge of that court or any judge 
assigned by the presiding officer of the Judicial Council, upon certifying that the judge is 
familiar with the record of the trial, may, unless otherwise disqualified, proceed with and 
finish the trial, but if the assigned judge is satisfied that neither he nor another substitute 
judge can proceed with the trial, the judge may, in his discretion, grant a new trial. 
(b) If, by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, the judge before whom a defendant 
has been tried is unable to perform the duties required of the court after a verdict of 
guilty, any other judge of that court or any judge assigned by the presiding officer of the 
Judicial Council may perform those duties. 
(c)(1)(A) A party to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify a 
judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a certificate that the motion is filed in good 
faith and shall be supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias or 
prejudice, or conflict of interest. 
(c)(1)(B) The motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later than 
20 days after the last of the following: 
(c)(l)(B)(i) assignment of the action or hearing to the judge; 
(c)(l)(B)(ii) appearance of the party or the party's attorney; or 
(c)(l)(B)(iii) the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based. 
If the last event occurs fewer than 20 days prior to a hearing, the motion shall be filed as 
soon as 
practicable. 
(c)(1)(C) Signing the motion or affidavit constitutes a certificate under Rule 11, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and subjects the party or attorney to the procedures and 
sanctions of Rule 11. No party may file more than one motion to disqualify in an action. 
(c)(2) The judge against whom the motion and affidavit are directed shall, without further 
hearing, enter an order granting the motion or certifying the motion and affidavit to a 
reviewing judge. If the judge grants the motion, the order shall direct the presiding judge 
of the court or, if the court has no presiding judge, the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council to assign another judge to the action or hearing. Assignment injustice court cases 
shall be in accordance with Utah Code Ann. § 78-5-138. The presiding judge of the court, 
any judge of the district, any judge of a court of like jurisdiction, or the presiding officer 
of the Judicial Council may serve as the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(A) If the reviewing judge finds that the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed 
in good faith and legally sufficient, the reviewing judge shall assign another judge to the 
action or hearing or request the presiding judge or the presiding officer of the Judicial 
Council to do so. Assignment injustice court cases shall be in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-5-138. 
(c)(3)(B) In determining issues of fact or of law, the reviewing judge may consider any 
part of the record of the action and may request of the judge who is the subject of the 
motion and affidavit an affidavit responsive to questions posed by the reviewing judge. 
(c)(3)(C) The reviewing judge may deny a motion not filed in a timely manner. 
(d)(i) If the prosecution or a defendant in a criminal action believes that a fair and 
impartial trial cannot be had in the jurisdiction where the action is pending, either may, by 
motion, supported by an affidavit setting forth facts, ask to have the trial of the case 
transferred to another jurisdiction. 
(d)(ii) If the court is satisfied that the representations made in the affidavit are true and 
justify transfer of the case, the court shall enter an order for the removal of the case to the 
court of another jurisdiction free from the objection and all records pertaining to the case 
shall be transferred forthwith to the court in the other county. If the court is not satisfied 
that the representations so made justify transfer of the case, the court shall either enter an 
order denying the transfer or order a formal hearing in court to resolve the matter and 
receive further evidence with respect to the alleged prejudice. 
(e) When a change of judge or place of trial is ordered all documents of record 
concerning the case shall be transferred without delay to the judge who shall hear the case. 
